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Abstract 
In this paper we study anonymous ecret sharing schemes. Informally, in an anonymous secret 
sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold 
which shares. In such schemes the computation of the secret can be carried out by giving the 
shares to a black box that does not know the identities of the participants holding those shares. 
Phillips and Phillips gave necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an anonymous 
secret sharing scheme where the size of the shares given to each participant is equal to the 
size of the secret. In this paper, we provide lower bounds on the size of the share sets in any 
(t,w) threshold scheme, and for an infinite class of non-threshold access structures. We also 
discuss constructions for anonymous secret sharing schemes, and apply them to access structures 
obtained from complete multipartite graphs. 
1. Introduction 
Informally, a secret sharing scheme is a method of distributing a secret key 7~ among 
a set of participants 9 in such a way that qualified subsets of 9 can reconstruct the 
value of K, whereas any other (non-qualified) subsets of 9’ cannot determine anything 
about the value of 7~. 
Secret sharing schemes are useful in any important action that requires the concur- 
rence of several designated people to be initiated, such as launching a missile, opening 
a bank vault or even opening a safety deposit box. Secret sharing schemes are also 
used in management of cryptographic keys and multi-party secure protocols (see 1121 
for example). 
The first secret sharing schemes that were studied are (t,~) threshold schemes. 
A (t.w) threshold scheme allows a secret to be shared among w participants in such 
a way that any t of them can recover the secret, but any t - 1 have absolutely no 
information on the secret. Shamir [2 l] and Blakley [2] showed how to construct (t, IV) 
threshold schemes. Subsequently, Ito et al. [14] and Benaloh and Leichter [1] described 
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a more general method of secret sharing. They showed how to realize a secret sharing 
scheme for any monotone access structure. (An access structure is the family of all 
subsets of participants that are able to reconstruct the secret). 
The survey by Stinson [23] contains a unified description of results in the area of 
secret sharing schemes. For different approaches to the study of secret sharing schemes, 
including schemes with ‘extended capabilities’ such as disenrollment, fault-tolerance, 
and pre-positioning, and a complete bibliography, we recommend the survey article by 
Simmons [22]. 
An ideal secret sharing scheme is a scheme in which the size of the shares given to 
each participant is equal to the size of the secret. Brickell and Davenport [5] showed 
a correspondence between ideal secret sharing schemes and matroids (see also [15]). 
In this paper we analyze anonymous secret sharing schemes. Informally, in an anony- 
mous secret sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which 
participants hold which shares. In such schemes the computation of the secret can be 
carried out by giving the shares to a black box that does not know the identities of 
the participants holding those shares. This would seem to be a desirable property in 
certain applications. For example, if the scheme is to be used to provide access to 
a secure area, then an anonymous scheme will provide security without the need for 
a separate identification protocol. 
Anonymous secret sharing schemes were first investigated in 1988 by Stinson and 
Vanstone [26]. In the model proposed in [26] the participants receive distinct shares (we 
will call such a scheme a ‘strict’ anonymous scheme). The authors proved 
a lower bound on the size of the shares for anonymous threshold schemes and provided 
optimal schemes for certain classes of threshold structures by using a combinatorial 
characterization of optimal schemes. Further results can be found in [20, 91. 
In 1992, Phillips and Phillips [ 181 considered a different model for anonymous secret 
sharing schemes. In their model, different participants are allowed to receive the same 
shares. They analyzed ideal anonymous secret sharing schemes, referred to in [ 181 
as ‘strongly ideal schemes’. Phillips and Phillips proved the interesting result that a 
strongly ideal scheme for an access structure r on w participants can be realized if 
and only if r is either a (1,~) threshold structure, a (w,w) threshold structure, or the 
closure of the edge set of a complete bipartite graph. 
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give formal definitions for 
various types of secret sharing schemes, and introduce some notation used in the paper. 
In Section 3 we provide a lower bound on the size of the share set (as a function of the 
size of the key set) in any anonymous (t, w) threshold scheme, and for an infinite class 
of non-threshold access structures. In Section 4 we consider strict anonymous secret 
sharing schemes. We prove a lower bound on the size of the share set for non-threshold 
access structures, generalizing the bound proved in [26]. In Section 5 we present some 
constructions for anonymous secret sharing schemes. In particular, we look at access 
structures which are the closure of the edge set of a complete multipartite graph, that 
is, access structures for which the set of participants can be identified with the vertex 
set V(G) of a graph G = (V(G), E(G)), and the subsets of participants qualified to 
reconstruct the secret are only those containing an edge of G. (Non-anonymous secret 
sharing schemes for graph access structures have been extensively studied in several 
papers, such as [3-6, 8, 24, 251). 
2. Definitions and notation 
A pcvjkt secret shuring scheme permits a secret to be shared among a set ./P of ~3 
participants in such a way that a qual$fird subset of b can recover the secret, but any 
non-c&$fied subset has absolutely no information on the secret. An UI‘L’~.KS .stwctuw 
I- is the set of all subsets of 9 that can recover the secret. 
Definition 2.1. Let .‘p = {PI,. . . ,P,} be a set of participants. A monotone unless .sttw- 
ture r on .Y is a subset T&2-“, such that 
A E I‘. AcA’&</P j A’E~‘. 
Definition 2.2. Let Y= {Pi,. . , P,, } bc a set of participants and let A G 2.‘. The c~losurr 
of A, denoted d(A), is the set 
cl(A) = {C: 3B E A such that B 2 C C Y}. 
For a monotone access structure r we have T=cl(T). If r is an access structure on 
9, then BE r is a minimal qualified set if A 6 r whenever A C B, .4 # B. The family 
of minimal qualified sets of r is denoted ro and is called the basis of r. We refer to 
a minimal qualified set as a busis set. It is easy to see that r is uniquely determined 
as a function of r,, namely, T=cl(T,). An access structure I- will be called triviul if 
either r =2’ or r= {“P} (i.e., if every set is a qualified set or if the only qualified 
set is the entire set of participants 9). 
Let .X’ be a set of q elements called secrets or h-e)a, and let .v’ be a finite set whose 
elements are called shares. Suppose a dealer D wants to share the secret key K t .X’ 
among the participants in ,/p (we will assume that D@“P). He does this by giving each 
participant PE.~ a share from 9. The dealer can distribute the same shares to different 
participants, hence in the following we will use braces { } to denote sets and square 
brackets [ ] to denote multisets (a multiset is a set containing repeated elements). 
We represent a secret sharing scheme by a collection of distribution rules. A distri- 
bution rule is a function 
.f’: .d u {D} --* .iy‘ u 9’ 
which satisfies the conditions ,f‘( D) E .X and f(e) E .Y’, for i = 1,2, . . . , w. A distribution 
rule ,f‘ represents a possible distribution of shares to the participants, where j’(D) is 
the secret key being shared, and ,f’(P,) is the share given to 9. If 9 is a family 
of distribution rules and K E .X; then .FK = {f E 9: j”(D) = K} is the family of all 
distribution rules having K as the secret. If K E .Y is the value of the secret that D 
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wants to share, then D will chose a distribution rule f E& uniformly at random, and 
use f to distribute shares to the participants. 
Let {P~(K)),E.IY b e a probability distribution on X, and let a collection of distri- 
bution rules for secrets in 3” be fixed. We define a perfect secret sharing scheme as 
follows. 
Definition 2.3. A perfect secret shuring scheme, with respect to the monotone access 
structure r C 2,“, is a collection of distribution rules that satisfy the following two 
properties: 
1. If a subset A E r of participants pool their shares, then they can determine the 
value of the secret K. Formally, ij’ A E r then jbr all a = {(fi,si): fi E A andsi E Y} 
with p(a) > 0, a unique secret KE X exists such thut p(h-la)= 1. 
2. If a subset A @r of participants pool their shares, then they can determine nothing 
about the value of the secret K (in an information-theoretic sense), even with infinite 
computational resources. Formally, ij’A #r then for all a = {(fi,si): fi EA and si E 9’} 
with p(a) > 0, and ji)r all K E X, it holds p(K-la) = p, (K). 
Property 1 means that the values of the shares held by A E r and the identities of 
the participants in A completely determine the secret K E 2’. Property 2 means that 
the probability that the secret is equal to K, given that the shares held by A $ r and 
the identities of the participants in A are specified by a, is the same as the u priori 
probability of the secret K. (From this it follows that for all a= {(e,Si): fl EA}, there 
exists an integer 1., such that, for every K E X, there exist exactly i,, distribution rules 
SE& such that f(fi)=si for all I: EA.) Therefore, no amount of knowledge of shares 
of participants not qualified to reconstruct the secret enables a Bayesian opponent to 
modify an a priori guess regarding the secret. 
Throughout this paper, we confine our attention to perfect schemes, so the term 
‘secret sharing scheme’ can be taken to mean ‘perfect secret sharing scheme’. 
A secret sharing scheme for which IX/ = 19’ IS called an ideal secret sharing 
scheme and an access structure admitting an ideal scheme will be referred as ideal 
access structure. 
We assume that the secret reconstruction phase is carried out by a trustworthy ma- 
chine that keeps secret all the received shares. This is not a strong assumption and it is 
more or less explicitly used in all usual secret sharing schemes. In fact, if the machine 
does not keep the received shares secret, then everyone who has access to the machine 
would know all the shares and therefore could reconstruct the secret even if he is not 
allowed to. 
In an anonymous secret sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without 
knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In such schemes the computation 
of the secret can be carried out by giving the shares to a trustworthy machine that 
does not know the identities of the participants holding those shares. The difference 
between a secret sharing scheme and an anonymous secret sharing scheme depends on 
the reconstruction function used by the trustworthy machine. 
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We define an anonymous secret sharing scheme as follows. 
Definition 2.4. An anonymous secret shuring scheme, with respect to the monotone 
access structure r C 2-“, is a collection of distribution rules which satisfies Property 2 
of Definition 2.3, as well as the following property: 
1. If a subset A E r of participants pool their shares (but keep their identities 
secret), then they can determine the value of the secret ti. Formally. iJ‘ A c r then ,fbr 
ull s = [s,: e. E A and s, E 91 with p(s) > 0, a unique secret K E X exists .ruch that 
p(tiIs)= 1. 
In this definition, Property 1 means that to compute the secret it is enough to know 
just the shares held by participants in a qualified set ~ it is not necessary to know the 
qualified set or which participants hold which shares. 
Note that instead we could have used the following weaker security condition in the 
definition of an anonymous scheme: 
2’. If a subset A 6 r of participants pool their shares (but keep their identities 
secret), then they can determine nothing about the value of the secret K (in an inform- 
ation-theoretic sense), even with infinite computational resources. Formally, if’ A @ I- 
then fiw ~11 s = [s,: e. E A and si E 91 bcith p(s) > 0, und for all K E X, it holds 
p(x.Is) = p, (K). 
However, in this paper, we will restrict our attention to schemes that satisfy Property 2 
since most known constructions produce schemes that satisfy this ‘stronger’ condition. 
Moreover, it is generally better to use the strongest security condition in designing any 
cryptographic protocol. 
Stinson and Vanstone [26] considered a model of anonymous secret sharing in which 
the participants receive distinct shares. We will refer to this model as a strict anony- 
mous secret sharing scheme. A strict anonymous scheme can be considered as an 
anonymous scheme with an additional property. 
We define a strict anonymous secret sharing scheme as follows. 
Definition 2.5. A strict anonymous secret sharing scheme, with respect to the mono- 
tone access structure r C: 2”, is a collection of distribution rules which satisfies Prop- 
erties 1 and 2 of Definition 2.4, as well as the following property: 
3. For any given secret key K E X, the participants in 9 receive distinct shares. 
Formully, jkw all K E X, for all s E .Y and for all P,.< E .?, it holds p(F: = s, P, = 
sIJC)=O. 
The following example illustrates the three different models of secret sharing for a 
particular access structure. 
Example 2.1. Let r, = {{PtP2}, {PrPs}, {P#j}} be the basis of a (2,3) threshold 
structure, r, on the set of participants 9 = {PI, P2, P3). We construct schemes for this 
access structure, in which the set Y contains nine elements, for all three models. 
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FI = {(t&l, 2), (192, O), (2,0,1), (3,4> 5), (4,523) (5,3,4),(6,7> 8),(7> 8,6), 
(8,697)) 
92 = {(0>3,6), (3,6, O), (6,0,3), ( 1,4,7), (4,7,1), (7,1,4), (2,5,8), (5,892) 
(8,2,5)] 
93 = {@,4,8)> (428, O), (8,0,4), ( 1,5,6),(5,6,1),(6,1,5), (2,3>7),(3,7>2), 
(7,2,3)] 
An ideal scheme 
We can realize an ideal secret sharing scheme (i.e. one in which there are nine 
possible keys) for r by using the technique of Shamir [21]. Let Y=X= GF(9). For 
any secret key K E X the family & of distribution rules will be constructed as 
It is easy to see that the distribution rules thus obtained constitute an ideal secret 
sharing scheme for I-. There are 81 distribution rules, nine for each possible secret 
key. 
An anonymous scheme 
The following collection of distribution rules comprise an anonymous scheme for r, 
in which there are five possible keys. (This scheme is an application of a construction 
given in Section 5.) 
90 = {(O,O,O),(l, 1,1),(2,2,2),(3,3,3),(4,4,4),(5,5,5), (6,6,6),(7,7,7), 
(8,8>8)> 
94= {(0,5,7),(5,7,0),(7,‘A5),(1,3,8),(3,8,1),(8, 1,3),(2,4>6),(4>6,2), 
(6,2,4)) 
It is easy to check that we have an anonymous scheme for r. Indeed, each pair of 
shares (x, y) E (Z9 x ZS) belongs to only one PK; hence the secret key is uniquely 
determined from any two shares. In each &, each possible share is assigned to each 
possible participant by exactly one distribution rule. Hence the secret key remains 
completely unknown, given a single share and the identity of the participant holding 
it. There are 45 distribution rules, nine for each possible secret key. 
A strict anonymous scheme 
The distribution rules in Fr, 92,9x, and 94 comprise a strict anonymous scheme 
for ra in which there are four possible keys. (This scheme is an application of 
a construction given in [26], and is optimal with respect to the size of the share 
set.) 
It is easy to check that these families of distribution rules realize an anonymous 
secret sharing scheme for r. Indeed, each pair of (distinct) shares x, y E Z’g belongs 
to only one gK, hence the secret key is uniquely determined; but any single share is 
assigned to any particular participant by exactly one distribution rule in each FK, so 
the secret key remains completely unknown. There are 36 distribution rules, nine for 
each possible secret key. 
2.1. Terminolo~qy ,fiom graph theory rmd design theoqt 
We first present some basic terminology from graph theory. We consider only undi- 
rected graphs that do not have loops or multiple edges. If G is a graph, we denote the 
vertex set of G by V(G) and the edge set by E(G). In an undirected graph the pair of 
vertices representing any edge is unordered. Thus, the pairs (u. D) and (c, u) represent 
the same edge. A graph G is conwctcd if any two vertices are joined by a path. The 
complete graph K,, is the graph on n vertices in which any two vertices are joined by 
an edge. The complete multipartite graph K,,,,,,,,,..,,,, is a graph on xi=, n, vertices, in 
which the vertex set is partitioned into subsets of size n, (1 < i < t) called pcrrts. such 
that (,c,Pv) is an edge if and only if 2’ and M’ are in different parts. An alternative way 
to characterize a complete multipartite graph is to say that the complementary graph 
is a vertex-disjoint union of cliques. Note that the complete graph K,, can be thought 
of as a complete multipartite graph with II parts of size 1. A stdde .srt or i&~pe&en/ 
.srt of G is a subset of vertices A C: V(G) such that no two vertices in A are joined by 
an edge in E(G). The stability number or in&pen&cc numbw x(G) is defined to be 
the maximum cardinality of a stable set of G. A dominuting .wt of a graph G is a set 
C” c V(G) such that every vertex r E V(G)\ V ’ is joined to at least one element of 1” 
by an edge in E(G). 
Given a graph G, we can obtain an access structure r based on G by computing 
the closure of the edge set E(G). Each edge in the graph determines two participants 
who can recover the secret. In this situation, we will identify r” with the graph G. 
We now present some basic terminology from design theory. A t-(r. li, ;,) design is 
a pair (C’. .&‘/I), where V is a set of I‘ elements (called points) and .‘p3 is a family of 
subsets of V of size k (called blocks), such that every subset of points of size t oc- 
curs in exactly i blocks. A t-(r, k, i.) design is said to be non-trivial if t < k < I’. 
A Strincr .systrm is a t-(t:, k, I) design, also denoted by S(t, k, 1’). Let (V. .a) be 
a Steiner system S(t, k,c). We say that (V,.d) is pcrrtitionablc if we can partition the 
set of blocks .& into sets .&I,. , J, in such a way that each ( V, -d,), for I < j < /, 
is a Steiner system S(t ~ I, k, I’). If a Steiner system S(t, k. 1’) is partitionable. then 
the integer / = (11 - t + 1 )/(k - t + 1 ). A partitionable S(2, k, c) is called r~,.solr- 
trble. For general information on the existence of t-(r, k. i.) designs we refer 
to [IO]. 
The following result will be used in the construction of anonymous secret sharing 
schemes for complete multipartite graphs. 
Theorem 2.1. For 2 6 k < 4, there exists N resol~wble S(2, k, c) if’ ur7d on[v if I’ E k 
mod k(k - 1). 
Proof. The case k = 2 is trivial. In fact, a resolvable S(2,2, C) is a one-factorization of 
K,., the complete graph on u vertices. The proof of Theorem 2.1 for the case k = 3 can 
be found in [19] (this is the well known ‘Kirkman’s schoolgirl problem’); for k = 4, 
see [13]. 0 
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Results on resolvable S(2, k, v) for larger k can be found in [IO]. 
3. Bounds on the size of the shares 
The following theorem of Phillips and Phillips gives necessary and sufficient condi- 
tions for an ideal anonymous secret sharing scheme to exist. 
Theorem 3.1 (Phillips and Phillips [18]). Let I be an access structure on a set of 
participunts pp. An ideal anonymous secret sharing scheme for I exists if and only 
if either I is a (l,IYp1) threshold structure, u (IYpI,j9pI) threshold structure, or the 
closure of a complete bipartite graph. 
In the remainder of this section, we provide lower bounds on the size of the share set 
as a function of the size of the key set in any (t, w) threshold scheme (1 < t < w), and 
for an infinite class of non-threshold access structures. From Theorem 3.1, we know 
that IYI > (XI, but the bound we prove in this section is an asymptotic improvement. 
Theorem 3.2. Let I be a (t, w) threshold structure with 1 < t < w. In any anonymous 
secret sharing scheme for I, with secrets in X, the size of the share set Y sutishes 
IYJ> [(w-t+2)y+l](l.*-l-l)~ 
Proof. Suppose the set of participants is 9 = {E: 1 d i < w}. Let IY] = v, let X = 
{ 1,. , q}, and let F denote the collection of distribution rules of the scheme. Denote 
h=w - t + 2. Choose any distribution rule fo EF, and define 
ps={fEF: f(fl)=fo(&), 1 < i d t - 2). 
For any f E 90, define 
A,f=[f(fi): t - 1 < i 6 w]. 
(That is, we look at all the distribution rules that contain a fixed list of shares for a 
specified non-qualified set of participants, as was done in [ 161.) In this way we get 
a collection &’ = [A,f: f E 901 of h-multisets of 9, which we refer to as blocks. 
Partition this collection of blocks into q subcollections, ~~21,. . . , sdq, determined by the 
corresponding keys for the distribution rules. This collection satisfies the following 
properties: 
1. If x occurs c, times in blocks in &; (counting multiplicities), then x occurs exactly 
c, times in blocks in A$, for 1 d j < q. (This follows from h applications of Property 2 
of Definition 2.4, by taking A to be the h different subsets Aj = {PI,. . ., P,_,,Pj}, 
t-l<j<w.) 
2. If [x, y] occurs in a block in &i, then [x, JJ] occurs in no blocks in &j if i # j. 
(This follows from Property 1 of Definition 2.4.) 
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We observe that Property 1 implies that 
/,d;l = c.,;rcr 
for 1 < i < y. We will denote this value by m. 
Now for each block A E .&‘, define .4” to be the set consisting of the distinct points 
in A (i.e., the ‘underlying set’ of points in A). Let cd: = {k: A E *pi;}. Consider the 
incidence structure .cyl” = {c&;, . . . ,.G&}. Any point x occurs at least ((1 - 1)~; + 1 times 
in .rj, since the pair [X,X] occurs in a block A E .r1, for at most one value of i. 
The average block size 6 in .o;/ satisfies the following inequality: 
3 (q 
- 
J ): 1)G + 
1 
m&- 1) > &I 
- 
1) __ . \ET/ mq mq 4 
Denote by r,(x) the average size of the blocks in .pj! containing X, and define 
Now, we have 
Then, we obtain the following: 
(from Jensen’s inequality) 
> mq (“““1 (from (1)) 
mh2(q - 1 )2 
- 
4 * 
Let x = max{ x(x): x f .Y’}. Then, we have that 
(1) 
Hence we have that 
x > &I - 1 I2 
4 . 
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Consequently, there is a point x E Y such that 
a(x) ’ 
h(q - 1)2 
4 . 
Consider L = 1 {y # x: {x, y} C k for some 2) 1. Then, L < u - 1. But 
L 2 C(%j(x) - 1) (from property 2.) 
= a(x)-q > h(q - lj2 - 4. 
4 
Thus, 
u > h(q - 1 )2 
-q+l 
4 






and the theorem is proved. 0 
The bound of the previous theorem is non-trivial (i.e., we get /,40/ > 1x1) when 
)X1 3 5. The following theorem gives a lower bound on the size of the shares held 
by participants for an infinite class of non-threshold access structures. 
Theorem 3.3. Let r be an access structure on a set 9 of w participants. Suppose 
there exists a set B & 9 such that B U {PI} # r for all P, E Yp\B, and B U {fi, Pj} E r 
for all (Pi,pJ) C_ S\B. Then, in any anonymous secret sharing scheme for r, with 
key set X, the size of the share set Y satisjies 
IYI > [(w - /Bl)w - 1 1 (1x1 - 1). 
Proof. Let 9 denote the collection of distribution rules of the scheme. Choose any 
distribution rule fa E 9, and define 
~a={f~~:f(P;)=fa(P,)forallP;~B}. 
For any f E go, define 
Ar = [f(e) : fi E 9\B]. 
Now repeat the remainder of the proof of Theorem 3.2, mutatis mutandis. 0 
As an example, consider the access structure having basis 
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In this case we can take B = {Ps} and the following corollary holds. 
Corollary 3.4. Let TO = {{P,, P3, P4}, {Pz, P4}, {P,, P2}} br the basis of m UC~.S.S 
structure on the set of participants .Y = (PI,P~,P~,P~)_ In any anonymous secret 
sharing scheme for r with a key set of’ size q, the size of‘ the .shure set .Y satisfies 
4. Strict anonymous schemes 
In this section we consider a different model of anonymous secret sharing scheme, 
where we require that the participants receive distinct shares. We will refer to such a 
scheme as a strict anonymous secret sharing scheme. This model was first investigated 
by Stinson and Vanstone [26] in the case of threshold schemes. Further results can be 
found in 120, 91. 
Remark 4.1. Stinson and Vanstone investigated a slightly more restricted model in 
which a (t. w) threshold scheme is constructed from a w-uniform hypergraph. This 
involves defining w! distribution rules from each hyperedge by ordering it in all possible 
ways. However, all results proved in [26] remain true in the more general model we 
consider in this paper. 
Stinson and Vanstone [26] proved the following result. 
Theorem 4.1 (Stinson and Vanstone [26]). In an)’ strict anonymous (t. MI) threshokl 
scheme, the size of the share set Y satisfies 
For an information-theoretic proof, see [7]. 
Here, we prove a lower bound on the size of the share set for general access struc- 
tures, which contains the previous bound as a special case. 
Theorem 4.2. Let r be an access structure on a set 9 of w participants. Suppose 
that there exists a set 3 C 9’ such that I%] = r, 3 $ r, and 3 U {pi} t r &f;,r all 
P, E .Y\B. Then, in an)) strict unonymous secret sharing scheme for r usith key’ .set .K 
the sire of’ the share set .Y satisjies 
19 3 (w - r)lX + r. 
Proof. Let .9 denote the collection of distribution rules of the scheme. Choose any 
distribution rule fa E F, and define 
9~ = {,f E 9: f(e) = fi(E) for all fl E 3). 
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For any f ~90, define 
A,r = [f (8) : fi E P\B]. 
In this way we get a collection .JZZ = [Af : f E Fo] of (w - r)-multisets of 9, which we 
refer to as blocks. Partition this collection of blocks into q subcollections, di, . . . , d,, 
determined by the corresponding keys for the distribution rules. 
Now, choose one set in each of these subcollections, say Ai E &i for i = 1,2,. . . , q. 
Since the scheme for r is a strict anonymous scheme, it is easy to see that the Ai’s 
satisfy the following properties. 
1. For i = 1,2 ,..., q, we have SnAi = 0. 
2. For i # j, we have Ai n Aj = 0 (for, if x E Ai n Aj, then there correspond two 
different keys to the same set of shares, S U {x}, distributed to some qualified subset). 
Hence, to construct a scheme for r, we need a share set of size at least 
(w - r)lXl + r. 0 
Even though the conditions of Theorem 4.2 seem quite strict, for any access structure 
r there does exist a set B of participants satisfying them. In fact, it is sufficient to take 
the set B as a non-qualified set of maximum size. For threshold access structures, this 
yields the bound of Theorem 4.1. In the case of a graph access structure, the following 
corollary is obtained. 
Corollary 4.3. Let G be a graph on w vertices. Then, in any strict anonymous secret 
sharing scheme for G, with key set X, the size of the share set Y satisfies 
I=Y 3 (w - 4G))IxI + a(G), 
where a(G) is the stability number of G 
In general, given a graph G, we want to find a set B satisfying the conditions of 
Theorem 4.2 such that the bound is maximized. Hence, the size of such a set B should 
be minimized. The best choice for B is to take a minimum size-independent set of G 
that is also a dominating set. We obtain the following. 
Corollary 4.4. Let G be a graph on w vertices. Then, in any strict anonymous secret 
sharing scheme for G with key set X, the size of the share set Y satisfies 
191 2 (w - P(G>Wl + P(G), 
where /3(G) is the minimum size of an independent set of G that is also a dominating 
set. 
For general graphs, to compute the minimum size independent set that is also 
a dominating set is hard. Indeed, given an integer 6’ and a graph G, to determine 
whether there exists a set V’ E V(G) of size 8 such that V’ is both a dominating set 
and an independent set is an NP-complete problem (see [ 111). However, for a partic- 
ular class of graphs, we can compute easily such a set V’. and thus obtain an explicit 
bound. 
Proof. For i = 1,2,. , t, let L$s V(G) be the ith part of G, with 1 C;j = u‘,. It is 
easy to see that the set VI is the minimum size independent set of G that is also 
a dominating set. 0 
5. Constructions for anonymous schemes 
In this section we discuss briefly some simple constructions for anonymous schemes. 
Some of these constructions are modifications of previously known constructions. As 
an illustration, we apply our constructions to access structures based on complete mul- 
tipartite graphs. 
First, we note that Brickell and Stinson [6] showed how to transform any secret 
sharing scheme for an access structure r into a strict anonymous one. 
Theorem 5.1. Suppose thut there erists a secret shoring scheme ,jbr uccess struc- 
ture r, huz:ing purticipunt set .‘P, kty .set .K and shure set .Y Then there esists u 
.stric t unonymous scheme _fbr uccess structure r, having kqs set .X untl .shurr srt 
.d x .x 
We now look at the concept of ‘splitting’ an access structure, an idea introduced 
in the context of graph access structures in [6] (note also that splitting is a special 
case of ‘insertion’ [ 171). Suppose r is an access structure for participant set 2, and let 
T : .Y + Z ‘~. For each P E 9, let P’ = {P} x { 1,. , t(P)} be a set of T(P) participants. 
Then define 9 = IJ,,,, P’ to be a new participant set. For each B E I-, and for each 
function (#J : B * Z+ such that 4(P) d z(P) for every P E B, let B,i, = {(P,qi(P)): P E 
B}. Take r’ to consist of all such sets B$, B E r. Then we say that f’ is obtained 
from r by splittiny. 
The following theorem holds. 
Theorem 5.2. Let r he an access structure on u .set .Y of participants, und supp~.se 
there exists u Strict anonymous scheme ,fbr r n,ith u ke). set of' size y cud CI shurr 
set of’ six C. Let r’ he any uccess .structurr obtained h~a splitting r. Then there 
exists un unonymous scheme jbr r’ IcYth u key set of’ sire q und u share set of 
six 13. 
26 C. Blundo, D. R. Stinson I Discrete Applied Mathematics 77 (I 997) 13-28 
Proof. Let 9 be the collection of distribution rules for the scheme realizing r. For 
every f E 9, define a new distribution rule ,f’ for the participants in 9’ by the rule 
f’(Q) = f(p) for every Q E P’. (In terms of the matrix A4 representing the scheme 
for r, we replace every column P by z(P) identical columns indexed by P’.) 0 
Here are some applications of this idea. Stinson and Vanstone [26] gave the following 
construction for (optimal) strict anonymous schemes: 
Theorem 5.3 (Stinson and Vanstone [26]). A strict anonymous scheme for a (t, w) 
threshold structure with a set X of (v - t + l)/(w - t + 1) keys having a set Y 
qf v shares exists if and only if there exists a Steiner system S(t, w,v) that can be 
partitioned into Steiner systems S(t - 1, w, v). 
Applying Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 we obtain the following. 
Theorem 5.4. Let G = K,,,,,Wz ,_.., WI be a complete multipartite graph on k parts. If 
there exists a resolvable Steiner system S(2, k,v), then there exists an anonymous 
secret sharing scheme for G for n set X of (v - 1 )/(k - 1) keys having a share set 
of size v. 
Proof. A complete multipartite graph with k parts can be obtained by splitting a com- 
plete graph on k vertices (which is a (2,k) threshold access structure). 0 
Using Theorem 2.1, Theorem 5.4 can be applied fork = 2,3 or 4 if 2: - k mod k(k - 1). 
In the case k = 2, this provides a scheme with q keys and q + 1 shares for an access 
structure which is the closure of the edge set of a complete bipartite graph, but it is 
possible to do better using the Phillips-Phillips construction (Theorem 3.1). 
In the case of a (2,~) threshold structure, we can construct an anonymous scheme 
having one more key than a strict anonymous scheme obtained from Theorem 5.3. 
Theorem 5.5. If there exists a resolvable Steiner system S(2, w, v), then there exists 
an anonymous (2, w) threshold scheme having a key set .X of size (v - l)/(w - 1) + 1 
and a share set Y of size v. 
Proof. If a resolvable Steiner system S(2, w, v) exists, then from Theorem 5.3 there 
exists a strict anonymous scheme with a key set of size (v - l)/(w - 1) and a share 
set Y of size v. Let 9 be the family of distribution rules of such a scheme. Let 
00 @ X be a new key, and define SW = {(x,x,. . ,x): x E 9’“). Consider the family 
9’ = 9 U FE. It is easy to check that 9’ constitutes a family of distribution rules 
for an anonymous secret sharing scheme for r with a set of (v - 1 )/(w - 1) + 1 keys 
having a share set Y of size v. 0 
Remarks 5.1. The scheme presented in Example 2.1 for the (2,3) threshold structure 
is based on the previous construction. 
In the following theorem, we present a technique to obtain strict anonymous secret 
sharing schemes for access structures constructed by splitting. 
Proof. Let .F be the collection of distribution rules for the scheme realizing r. Let 
.‘/ be the share set for the scheme 3, and define Y’ = .Y’ x {i: 1 < i < T}. For 
every ,f’ E .“i;, define a new distribution rule ,f“ for the participants in ./p’ by the rule 
,f”(f.i) = (,f‘(f),i) for every P E .Y, 1 < i < T(P). 0 
Again, we will apply this construction in the case of complete multipartite graphs. 
Theorem 5.7. Let G = K,,,,.,+,: ,..,,, ,,, be u complete multipurtite yruph such that M’I < 14.2 
< < wk. Suppose there exist u resolvable Steiner .sJ’stem S(2,k, r). Th~x, thrrt) 
rrists u strict anonymous secret shuring .scheme,fi)r G n.ith N .srt .iy of’(~. .- 1 )!(k ~ 1 ) 
ktj?a. having u shurt~ set oj’ size M’~-c. 
If art = 1~2 = .. = wk, then by Corollary 4.5 the scheme is optimal with respect 
to the size of the share set. For example. in the case k = 2. we obtain the following 
corollary. 
Corollary 5.8. Let G be a complete bipartite gruph K,,,,,. Then there rrists un op- 
timal .strict unonymous scheme ,for G .fbr unto set N of’ q > 3 keJ’.s, q odd, hurinq 
(q + 1 )M’ possible shures. 
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